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Abstract
Electronic markets, distributed peer-to-peer applica-
tions and other forms of online collaboration are all based
on mutual trust, which enables transacting peers to over-
come the uncertainty and risk inherent in the environment.
Reputation systems provide essential input for computa-
tional trust as predictions on future behaviour based on the
past actions of a peer. In order to analyze the maturity of
current reputation systems, we compare eleven reputation
systems within a taxonomy of the credibility aspects of a
reputation system. The taxonomy covers three topics: 1)
the creation and content of a recommendation, 2) the selec-
tion and use of recommenders, and 3) the interpretation and
reasoning applied to the gathered information. Although
we find it possible to form a trusted reputation management
network over an open network environment, there are still
many regulatory and technical obstacles to address. This
survey reveals various good mechanisms and methods used,
but the area still requires both a) formation of standard
mechanisms and metrics for reputation system collabora-
tion and b) standard metainformation of right granularity
for evaluating the credibility of reputation information pro-
vided.
1. Introduction
Electronic markets, distributed peer-to-peer applications
and other forms of online collaboration are all based on mu-
tual trust, which enables transacting peers to overcome the
uncertainty and risk inherent in the environment. Reputa-
tion systems provide essential input for computational trust
as predictions on future behaviour based on a peer’s past
actions. Information about these actions can also be re-
ceived from other members of a reputation network who
have transacted with the peer. However, the credibility of
this third-party information must be critically assessed.
The underlying goal in all reputation systems is predict-
ing a peer’s future actions, given knowledge about its past
behaviour. This knowledge is ideally gathered via first-hand
transactions, but it becomes costly to have to interact with
every peer, including the malicious ones. To alleviate the
cost, peers share their experiences through the reputation
system, which makes it possible for the entire community
to detect and isolate misbehaving peers effectively. We re-
fer to this shared information as recommendations.
As no actors in the network are fully trusted, recommen-
dation credibility must be critically assessed. Reputation
systems have been widely used for various applications, and
work on credibility assessment of the provided reputation
information is becoming increasingly important as the tech-
nology extends to areas where more resources and business
value depend on making correct trust decisions.
A peer can provide inaccurate reputation information
for a variety of reasons. A colluding peer claims without
grounds to have had positive experiences with another peer
to increase its reputation, expecting some of its colluder’s
profits from defecting. A peer can also defame another peer
by providing undeserved bad experience information, in or-
der to increase its own reputation in relation to the target.
Providing random information may allow a peer to bene-
fit from participating in the reputation network without the
cost of performing transactions itself. Furthermore, human
users have social reasons for skewing their feedback. Fi-
nally, the targets of reputation information can change their
behaviour over time, or discriminate against particular peers
while cooperating with others.
All these kinds of misbehaviour in a reputation system
make it important to separate accurate information from in-
accurate. A thorough credibility analysis increases the sys-
tem’s resistance against malicious peers, if supported in the
system’s information and operation models.
We believe it is possible to create a trusted reputation
management network to support open, online collaborations
(e.g. [8]), and therefore analyze the maturity of current rep-
utation systems. We compare eleven systems in terms of 1)
the creation and content of a recommendation, 2) the selec-
tion and use of recommenders, and 3) the interpretation and
reasoning applied to the gathered information. In the com-
parison taxonomy, the differentiating aspect proved to be
the way credibility of reputation information was managed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes our taxonomy, while Section 3 presents the dis-
cussed reputation systems. The following three sections
present the analysis based on a division to three criteria sets:
Section 4 compares approaches to recommendation creation
and content. Section 5 analyzes the selection and use of rec-
ommenders. Section 6 discusses the reasoning and interpre-
tation the systems apply to the gathered recommendations.
We conclude by summarizing the findings and with recom-
mendations for directions of further work on the area.
2. Taxonomy of credibility aspects
Our taxonomy of the credibility aspects of a reputation
system covers three topics: 1) The creation and content of a
recommendation, 2) the selection and use of recommenders,
and 3) the interpretation and reasoning applied to the gath-
ered information. The first topic determines whether the
information in a recommendation provides sufficient basis
for credibility analysis, be it implemented or left as poten-
tial extensions. The second and the third topics determine
the quality of and the reasoning performed on the gathered
information respectively.
The creation of a recommendation involves combining
local experience information into a standard form to present
to another actor. The encoded information can include both
positive and negative experiences or focus on either, and re-
ports can contain either single experiences or more general,
aggregated opinions. The recommendation’s target may be
given a chance to comment on the statement as well.
The content of the final recommendation, both that of
the rating or opinion and of other related information, de-
termines the transparency of the creation and transfer pro-
cess to the target. For separating new and fresh information
from old, its time of creation or possibly the time of the
transaction the recommendation relates to may be reported.
Similarly, the recommendation can include a way to express
confidence, or lack thereof, of the recommender in its state-
ment. Finally, for systems where the recommendation is
passed through mediators, additional information is needed
to ensure the transparency of the mediation process.
A node gathering recommendation information can ei-
ther actively select its recommenders from the set of all pos-
sible nodes, or simply allow and expect any knowledgeable
nodes to provide recommendations. In addition, the gath-
ering node can be the trustor itself or e.g. a centralized en-
tity collecting all recommendations. These two dimensions
form four different variants of reputation system operational
modes [2], each with their own credibility qualities, threats
and bias possibilities. If information is not gathered by the
trustor itself, the transparency provided by the content of
the recommendation becomes even more important. A cen-
tral criterion to consider in all cases is the credibility of the
recommender, which can affect both its selection and later
the weight given to its recommendations.
Mediating recommendations brings its own threats and
possibilities. While using mediators adds the threat of mod-
ifying and withholding information, it also provides a pos-
sibility to include additional information such as a meta-
recommendation about the mediated information.
Once the recommendations have been acquired, they
must be combined with any local experience and aggre-
gated into a suitable format that could support a trust de-
cision. There are several considerations that can be applied
to the gathered data. The trustor or the information gath-
erer can analyze various background information to set the
recommendations in a context. The trustor’s own transac-
tions with the trustee form the core of local experience, and
to evaluate the recommender, the gatherer can consider both
the past transactions with the recommender and the past rec-
ommendations received by it. Track record information can
also be weighted based on recency.
Finally, the system may analyze the overall credibility of
the processed information. A low amount of gathered in-
formation can be one source of uncertainty, and the quality
of the sources has a strong effect on the credibility of the
result. The general environment the reputation system op-
erates in can be taken into account as well. For example,
in some environments the fear of reprisals or a general ten-
dency to reciprocate both in the positive and negative can
skew the results.
3. Compared reputation systems
We have chosen eleven systems for our analysis:
eBay [4], Unitec [7], FuzzyTrust [15], REGRET [14],
NICE [9], Managing the Dynamic Nature of Trust
(MDNT) [16], PeerTrust [17],Managing Trust [1],Max-
imum Likelihood Estimation of Peers’ Performance
(MLE) [3], EigenTrust [6] and Travos [11]. The sys-
tems represent a wide range of applications with different
requirements for reputation analysis. If the reputation esti-
mation should support e.g. a low-risk selection of an agent
to download a given file from, the situation does not war-
rant as careful analysis as e.g. finding a business partner
would. Current systems represent relatively low-risk envi-
ronments, while reputation systems designed for more com-
plex, business-to-business collaboration environments are
also on the rise [10, 13].
Our main system selection criterion has been that it pro-
vides some kind of systematic description of the facilities
available for credibility analysis. Credibility analysis adds
complexity, and many reputation system descriptions have
left it outside their scope or only suggested where to begin,
Table 1. Analyzed reputation systems
System Application Area Actors Reputation Value
eBay electronic marketplace human statistics, text
Unitec generic framework human configurable
FuzzyTrust multi-agent marketplace agents numeric
REGRET multi-agent marketplace agents numeric, categorized
NICE cooperative applications agents configurable
MDNT online communities agents numeric, {0,..,6}
PeerTrust online communities agents numeric, [0,1]
Managing Trust online communities agents numeric, -1, 0, 1
MLE online communities agents probability
EigenTrust file sharing agents probability
Travos Grid services agents probability
e.g. by treating recommendations as a service with its own
trust category. Table 1 summarizes the systems selected.
The commercial eBay reputation system stores users’
ratings linked to their profiles and related transactions, but
leaves the credibility analysis to the human user. Unitec
is also clearly directed towards a human user, but it per-
forms automated credibility analysis as well. The content of
a recommendation is not fixed, and the system could handle
product recommendations with the same algorithm as well.
FuzzyTrust and REGRET are both designed for multi-
agent marketplaces, but they apply rather different ap-
proaches to reputation estimation. In FuzzyTrust, local
trust scores are generated through fuzzy inference, and ag-
gregated to global reputation values. In REGRET, three
viewpoints are applied as needed to infer a local reputation
view, based on the social relations between peers. NICE
is designed for cooperative applications on the Internet.
Trustors are given signed receipts of successful transac-
tions, “cookies”, as a sign of some trust. These can be used
to link actors into a weighted trust chain.
MDNT, PeerTrust, Managing Trust andMLE are de-
signed for peer-to-peer community environments, which
encompass both multi-agent marketplaces and cooperative
applications and can host a multitude of activities: dis-
tributed applications, information exchange such as file
transfers, and transactions as on online marketplaces. Their
approaches to reputation are varying as well. In MDNT,
a reputation estimate involves predicting the trustee’s be-
haviour probabilistically, based on experience from a spe-
cific time period. MLE also uses a probabilistic approach,
and considers the probability of recommenders to provide
incorrect information. PeerTrust considers transaction and
community contexts when estimating reputation. Finally,
Managing Trust considers only negative experiences, and
allows recommenders to remain anonymous.
EigenTrust is a reputation system for peer-to-peer file
sharing. It relies specifically on a global, shared view of
reputation. Credibility analysis is used in calculating each
global reputation value, however. Travos aims to ensure
good interactions between self-interested software agents in
large scale open systems, such as the Grid. The agents pro-
vide interchangeable services, and reputation information is
used to choose the most trustworthy partner. It bases repu-
tation expression on Beta probability distributions.
4. Recommendation creation and content
We first compare different approaches to creating a rec-
ommendation, and what kind of experience is conveyed in
it. The second part of the section focuses on what the con-
tent of a recommendation is, including how the conveyed
experience is expressed and what metadata is provided to
support the analysis. Table 2 summarizes the analysis.
When creating a recommendation, the recommender an-
alyzes the experience information it has and produces a
statement in an agreed-upon format to convey it to another
node. Negative and positive experience information are
both used in all systems except Managing Trust, where
only negative experiences are stored. Including both allows
the system to tell apart lack of experience and good experi-
ences only, which is a valuable distinction.
A recommendation can be a single rating created after a
transaction with the trustee in order to evaluate its quality
or an opinion about the trustee formed by the aggregation
of individual ratings. Both approaches seem popular. Ag-
gregation saves traffic, providing better scalability, but re-
ducing transparency.
If aggregated opinions are used for recommendations,
the aggregation method used by the recommender becomes
relevant. Of the 6 systems using opinions, NICE and
Unitec do not specify the aggregation method and simply
assume a policy is in place for determining it. The aggre-
gation policy can be shared among all peers in a network,
or locally defined by each peer. Not tying the system to a








eBay rating -1 / 0 / 1 T, R free text
Unitec opinion unspecified anything R
√
recommender signature
FuzzyTrust rating x ∈ [0, 1] T
REGRET opinion weighted avg. x ∈ [−1, 1] (R) √
NICE opinion unspecified x ∈ [0, 1] R recommender signature
MDNT opinion CCCI metric n ∈ {0, .., 6} R
PeerTrust rating x ∈ [0, 1] T, R context, recommender signature
Managing Trust rating existence mediator id
MLE rating 0 / 1 T, R
EigenTrust opinion exp. differ-
ence
norm(p− n) (R)
Travos opinion exp. counters p, n ∈ N (R) (√)
single policy provides generality, allowing the system to be
used with a broader application range. However, the user
base within each application may be limited by the lack of
a global agreement: subnetworks with separate policies are
technically interoperable, but not necessarily semantically.
In REGRET, an opinion is calculated as the weighted
average of single experience ratings, with more weight
given to newer experiences. Travos and EigenTrust keep
counters of positive and negative experiences, and use them
to produce the aggregated opinion. Travos simply presents
both counters, while EigenTrust calculates their difference
and normalizes the value between the range [0, 1]. In both
systems, a good experience is defined as the trustee provid-
ing the service promised, and there are no grey areas for sin-
gle experiences. InMDNT, the opinion presented is calcu-
lated the same way as a trustor calculates a reputation value
when it has local experiences, via the CCCI metric [5]. The
metric considers the fulfillment of different expectations or
criteria the trustor has for an interaction, and assigns them
weights based on their importance and whether they have
been clearly conveyed to the trustee.
Allowing the target to comment on a recommendation is
very rare in reputation systems, with only one system sup-
porting it. The eBay reputation system resides on a central-
ized server. It shows all ratings as a part of a user’s profile,
and the user can add a brief comment to each rating. In
decentralized reputation systems, an actor may never know
what kind of statements are made of its behaviour. The tar-
get’s comments are also more challenging to include in an
automated credibility analysis; eBay delegates the credibil-
ity analysis to the human user, who can to a degree evaluate
the response based on its arguments.
For most systems, the main content of a recommendation
is a single numeric value, but the scales used vary between
discrete values and real numbers in a range. The Unitec
recommendation is a generic wrapper around any form of
value, and data aggregation is based on a local policy that
fits the format. In Managing Trust, only the existence of
a negative recommendation matters, and the value of a rec-
ommendation is not discussed nor used in the analysis.
In addition to the value, the recommendation contains
various metadata items. All systems either include the target
identity—a pseudonym or a stronger identifier—in the rec-
ommendation or provide it implicitly, e.g. as an answer to a
query about a specific trustee. Managing Trust is the only
system in our analysis to allow the sources of complaints to
remain anonymous, but even this system uses the identity
of the mediator storing them. Complete anonymity makes
it impossible to estimate credibility based on the source of
information. However, should the environment demand it,
methods such as trusted third party mediators can be used
to provide good privacy to recommenders.
Some metadata items provide support for giving vary-
ing weights to recommendations, for example to prefer re-
cent information over old. Timing information is relevant
for both the transaction a rating can be based on (indicated
by T in Table 2) and the time when the recommendation
itself is created (indicated by R). Transaction time informa-
tion in the case of opinion-based reputation systems can be
used to weight the single ratings in their aggregation. Rec-
ommendation time information is provided implicitly when
a recommendation is generated as a response to a query
(indicated by (R)), as is the case with EigenTrust, RE-
GRET and Travos, and all recommendations become equal
in that aspect. Not all systems use the time information they
gather; e.g. MLE suggests a time stamp to be included in
Table 3. Selection and use of recommenders
System Selection Basis for Selection Gathering Mediation Recommender Credibility
eBay all centralized indirectly
Unitec possible bias user defined trustor
√
recommendation record
FuzzyTrust some bias honesty, not loaded trustor transaction record
REGRET no bias social relations trustor trans. record+social relations
NICE no bias strongest trust path trustee
√
transaction record




Managing Trust all trustor
√
trans. record for mediator only
MLE undefined subset of experienced trustor
√
probability to lie
EigenTrust all a few peers transaction record
Travos all trustor recommendation record
the recommendation as a part of the key for storing it, not
for weighting purposes.
The recommender’s confidence on the information it
provides is another weighing factor. None of the systems
sharing ratings use it, as a good experience is considered
well-defined and detectable. For opinions, confidence is re-
lated to the amount of information contained in the opin-
ion and could be given subjectively, e.g. in REGRET and
Unitec, where a recommendation is provided along with the
subjective confidence of the recommender, or objectively,
e.g. in Travos, which includes a confidence measure im-
plicitly via the numbers of good and bad experiences.
Five of the analyzed systems use mediators: Unitec,
NICE, PeerTrust, Managing Trust and MLE. Of these,
all but Managing Trust and MLE include the recom-
mender’s digital signature in the recommendation to guar-
antee its integrity. In addition, Unitec mediators pro-
vide meta-recommendations. In Managing Trust, recom-
menders remain anonymous, but the credibility of the me-
diators storing the recommendations is estimated based on
their transaction history.
5. Selection and use of recommenders
The criteria for recommender selection and use exam-
ine the sources and transfer of third party information used
in the reputation system. The methods for selecting rec-
ommenders and possible weighting of the information they
present have a strong impact on the quality of the result-
ing reputation estimate. If a group of faulty recommenders
can block out other nodes from providing information to
the trustor, there is little rigorous analysis can do. The same
applies if the selection method simply does not reach po-
tential recommenders who have experiences to share. In a
general peer-to-peer network, the reputation system must be
prepared to analyze a mix of correct and faulty information
and have some ability to categorize the provided informa-
tion accordingly.
In a peer-to-peer network with new nodes constantly ap-
pearing and old ones leaving, most nodes tend to only be
connected to a few other nodes, while a handful of nodes
become highly connected [12]. This phenomenon affects
the amount of reputation information available about the
nodes. A special group of actors to consider are the new-
comers, who generally need a chance to prove themselves.
While networks with low-cost identities must also protect
against malicious identity changers, it is important to keep
a balance, and not raise the threshold for joining the net-
work as a newcomer too high. The recommender selection
and use comparison is summarized in Table 3.
The selection of recommenders involves a trade-off be-
tween scalability and consistently gathering a good repre-
sentation of recommenders. We have estimated whether
the selection method can skew the result some way when
compared to using all possible recommenders with the al-
gorithm. However, as long as recommending is voluntary,
there is a natural skew in the information to begin with.
Five systems use recommendations from all peers: eBay,
PeerTrust, Managing Trust, EigenTrust and Travos. Of
the remaining six, we estimate two to have basically no
skewing caused by limiting the number of recommenders.
REGRET groups peers according to their social context,
such as their relationship with the trustee, and then chooses
the most representative member of each group to give rec-
ommendations by fuzzy rules [14]. The method makes ac-
tual skews difficult to estimate, however, and open to in-
terpretation. In NICE, the trustee tries to locate chains of
first-hand recommendations from the trustor to itself.
In FuzzyTrust, recommenders are chosen through
global weighting based on their number of performed trans-
actions and local trust score. The weight is then compared
to a threshold that is set based on the peer’s role in the
network—a superpeer with a high number of transactions
has a higher threshold than a regular peer, for load balanc-
ing reasons. The influence of peers with many transactions
is thereby somewhat reduced. In MDNT, recommenders
are selected based on their credibility. This lowers the like-
lihood of new recommenders to get their voice heard, as
peers who gain credibility fastest at first will continue to
remain the most credible unless they get caught with false
statements. Unitecmay have a bias in the selection method,
as it is left for the user to decide. ForMLE, reputation esti-
mation is based only on a subset of the existing recommen-
dations, but the the selection method is not defined.
The most common solution for recommendation gather-
ing in distributed systems is to leave it to the trustor. In
eBay, recommendations are stored and analyzed on a cen-
tralized server and completed reports are served to trustors.
Decentralized systems provide two exceptions to the norm
as well. In NICE, the trustee itself stores signed “cook-
ies”, receipts that the signer has had positive experiences
with it. It also gathers recommendations in the form of
trust chains when needed. Information about negative ex-
periences is stored on the trustor, as the trustee would have
a strong incentive to omit it. In EigenTrust, reputation val-
ues are global. They are based on a majority vote of a few
randomly chosen peers who first gather recommendations
from the network, then weight them according to their trust
in the recommender. Some steps are also taken to make
the calculating peer unaware of the identity of the peer it is
calculating a reputation value for.
The systems using mediators are marked in the fifth col-
umn in Table 3. As mentioned in the previous section, three
of them use digital signatures to ensure that the recommen-
dation is not modified on the way, but none have taken mea-
sures to defend against a mediator omitting information.
In NICE, the effects of omission are borne by the trustee
alone, as it must locate a chain of trust from the trustor to it-
self. Negative experiences are remembered by the trustor.
In Managing Trust, the trustor does not know the orig-
inal recommender, so it must evaluate, based on transac-
tion experience alone, whether the mediator might have cre-
ated negative recommendations of its own or omitted them.
MLE does not consider mediator credibility. In addition,
the trustee itself stores its recommendations, which raises a
considerable credibility issue.
In PeerTrust, recommendations are saved distributedly,
searchable by the trustee’s id. The mediator does nothing
but repeating the set of signed recommendations it is re-
sponsible of storing, and can omit information at will.
Unitec appears to realize the most benefit from media-
tors, through meta-recommendations. Each mediator in the
path the recommendation takes can comment on how trust-
worthy it considers the statement from the previous actor.
Recommendation queries are forwarded systematically to
specific recommender groups, so mediators will typically
have an opinion of the recommender they comment on.
Estimating the credibility of the recommender separately
protects against peers that performwell in their transactions,
but provide faulty recommendations. FuzzyTrust, NICE,
and EigenTrust follow the simple model and assume a
straightforward connection between transaction and recom-
mendation trustworthiness. REGRET and PeerTrust fol-
low the trend, although REGRET also incorporates so-
cial relationships, and PeerTrust suggests calculating a per-
sonal similarity measure as an alternative for estimating rec-
ommender credibility. Similarity measures are commonly
used in product recommender systems, where credibility
cannot be measured objectively.
The eBay reputation system supports only transaction
trustworthiness directly, although a human user can also uti-
lize some indirect information on the recommender, such as
tone and form of ratings the recommender has given in gen-
eral as well as the targets’ comments to them.
Unitec, MDNT, Travos and MLE adjust the weight of
the recommendation based on a specialized measure for
how often the recommender has been correct or not in its
past recommendations to the trustor. In Unitec, correctness
is determined by the human user, while for Travos it is ap-
parently automated. MDNT measures the distance of the
recommendation from the actual evaluation of the trustee in
the context of a transaction by the CCCI metric [5], to form
its credibility measure. MLE calculates the probability of
the recommender to lie based on its earlier interactions with
the recommender. This can be done either separately for
each peer or at the level of the whole network, in which
case all peers have the same probability to lie.
6. Reasoning and interpretation
Once reputation information is collected, it must be ag-
gregated into a suitable format to support trust decisions.
The third set of criteria evaluate the analysis a reputation
system applies in the gathered information. We examine
how recommendations are aggregated into a reputation esti-
mate, and what the interpretation given to the final estimate
is. We also analyze whether the result is evaluated for inter-
nal credibility, or degree of certainty. Table 4 summarizes
these three points of the analysis. We also look into the kind
of information history stored and used and into how systems
are adjusted to their application area and social setting.
The recommendation aggregation method is generally
based on summing up the given recommendation values,
multiplied by weights based on factors such as recommen-
dation credibility. In NICE, the final reputation value is
determined as the strength of the strongest chain, or the
Table 4. Reasoning and interpretation applied to the gathered information
System Aggregation Interpretation Evaluation
eBay Statistics and full data report only various data
Unitec Weighted statistics report only unspecified
FuzzyTrust Weighted average threshold or rank
REGRET Statistics, fuzzy inference threshold or rank per dimension
NICE Strongest path’s strength threshold
MDNT Weighted average threshold
PeerTrust Weighted average + context threshold or rank unspecified
Managing Trust Weighted sum threshold iterative mediator evaluation
MLE Probabilistic threshold
EigenTrust Weighted average probability
Travos Probabilistic, fit beta distribution rank
sum of the strongest disjoint chains. The strength of a trust
chain is equal to the lowest recommendation value between
two nodes on it. PeerTrust uses transaction context in the
weighting whereas a community context factor can be used
to adjust the average result. In REGRET, reputation is
calculated as the weighted sum of a set of reputation val-
ues mapped to the local experience, the social relationships
of the trustee, and the correlation between reputation cate-
gories. The weights are reliability measures estimated for
each reputation value.
Travos uses a probabilistic aggregation that fits the ex-
perience information gathered into beta probability distri-
butions, and aggregates different items by summing the dis-
tributions. For each item, the probability distribution is ad-
justed towards an uniform probability based on how likely
it is that the recommender is correct. In MLE, a repu-
tation value is the probability of a peer to cooperate in a
transaction. It is chosen to maximize the probability of the
observed available experience information in the predictive
model, which also takes into account the calculated proba-
bilities of recommenders to lie.
The final interpretation of the result is most commonly
threshold-based: if the trustee’s reputation value is high
enough, the trustor will decide to transact with it. This
approach is taken by NICE, MDNT, Managing Trust
and MLE. On the other hand, FuzzyTrust, REGRET and
PeerTrust do not specify how the final measure is inter-
preted, but both threshold- and rank-based approaches are
possible. Only Travos explicitly uses a rank-based ap-
proach, where a trustor orders a group of potential partners
based on their reputation for selection purposes. Eigen-
Trust uses the resulting reputation value as a probability
of selecting the trustee as the peer to transact with. Finally,
eBay and Unitec do not perform the interpretation at all,
as they present a report to a human user. In eBay, both in-
terpretations are possible, with thresholds more common.
Generally, rank-based selection is only usable when sev-
eral potential partners can provide a similar service and are
therefore interchangeable.
Evaluating the result in terms of credibility or reliability
is done only rarely. REGRET calculates a reliability value
for each type of reputation, based on a variety of factors
such as the available information, the variability of the indi-
vidual ratings, the confidence of the recommender and the
social relationships. It also estimates a reliability measure
for the final estimated reputation. Both eBay and Unitec
provide reports, for which varying metadata to support an
evaluation is available. However, as Unitec does not define
the format of the report in the system, the availability of this
metadata to the user depends on the system configuration.
PeerTrust also proposes the compilation of a confidence
value associated with the reputation estimate, but instead of
a specific measure, it presents a tentative suggestion for the
value to reflect the number of transactions and the standard
deviation of the recommendations depending on different
communities.
The credibility of the estimated reputation value depends
also on the following factors: the history of transactional in-
formation, as the more information is used the more accu-
rate the result will be; and on giving higher weight to recent
information about the peer’s behaviour, as it is more likely
to be indicative of its future behaviour.
As noted earlier, the information history available to
a reputation network can be divided into two categories:
transactional history, and the history of accurate recom-
mendations. The full transaction history is stored by eBay,
PeerTrust andManaging Trust, whileMLE uses a subset
only. In NICE, the trustor and the trustee divide the task of
storing the transactional history between them, as recom-
mendations which expire after a given period of time. RE-
GRET, Travos, EigenTrust, MDNT and FuzzyTrust use
both information about transactions and the recommender’s
track record as a recommender. Unitec does not store his-
tory, but a single current opinion value that is updated by
each experience item. This is a scalability trade-off in ex-
change for some lost details.
Recent transactions are given more weight in reputation
estimation in many systems, which is the usual reason to
include time information as summarized in Table 2 earlier.
FuzzyTrust uses transaction times along with other factors
to estimate weights for recommendations when calculating
the reputation view. In one proposed version of reputation
estimation metric for PeerTrust, transaction times are used
as a part of a context factor that weighs recommendations.
Both REGRET and MDNT use transaction times when
calculating an opinion-based recommendation, but do not
share them. In addition,MDNT uses recommendation time
information for giving weight to recency in recommender
credibility updates. While eBay does not use time infor-
mation in the numeric data, it sorts the text comments by
recency and makes the times of transactions and recommen-
dations visible to the user. NICE uses the recommendation
time to prune old recommendations.
Unitec does not specify its aggregation method nor its
credibility calculation, but since it stores the time of rec-
ommendation, it could be used in an analysis. Managing
Trust, MLE, EigenTrust and Travos do not use transac-
tion or recommendation recency information, considering
all experience information equal in that sense.
We analyzed whether systems were adjusted to their en-
vironment of operation, and found two design approaches
concerning this: 1) Allowing more than one level of rep-
utation calculation is an adjustment to the technical net-
work environment. It allows systems to differentiate be-
tween very clear or “routine” decisions and situations re-
quiring more careful analysis. 2) Addressing the tendency
for reciprocity and fear of reprisals is an adjustment to the
social environment, involving considerations for typical hu-
man behaviour. People have a tendency to reciprocate: re-
spond to positive and negative feedback in a like manner.
This can lead to a recommender not wanting to give nega-
tive recommendations out of fear of negative consequences.
Several of the evaluated systems are capable of doing
two or more different levels of reputation calculation based
on the information available. If enough local experience
is available, it can be used alone to calculate a reputation
value. If local information alone is insufficient, recommen-
dations are brought into the evaluation. MDNT and Travos
use this approach. REGRET has even more levels of fall-
back, such as calculating the reputation of the social neigh-
bourhood of the trustee. Managing Trust allows the trustor
to evaluate the credibility of the mediators iteratively when
the information they provide does not immediately lead into
a decision. Flexibility in evaluation allows systems to bal-
ance between more accuracy and lighter calculations ac-
cording to situation.
General reciprocity and fear of reprisals are only rarely
considered by the systems we evaluated. The eBay sys-
tem actively encourages users to avoid giving negative rat-
ings before at least trying to resolve the problem offline, so
the skew towards positive is known. Managing Trust pro-
tects against reprisals by keeping the original recommender
anonymous. The authors describing Unitec also include
suggestions for adding some privacy for the recommender.
This kind of protection makes it less necessary to include
considerations of the environment influencing the gathered
information. REGRET is the only system to consider so-
cial relationships between peers when calculating the cred-
ibility of each recommendation; it uses the information for
recommender selection, and to determine a neighbourhood
whose members’ reputation can be used to represent the
reputation of a particular member for whom it is difficult
to estimate directly.
7. Conclusions
Open collaborations management needs the support of
robust reputation management. The survey of current repu-
tation systems reveals various good mechanisms and meth-
ods used in the systems, but the area is still immature.
There are two points of focus for designing a reputation
system to perform well in its field: social requirements and
scalability to real use. We have focused on analyzing the
former, as there was insufficient information available on
the scalability of the analyzed systems. In addition, the sim-
ulations vary quite a bit in size and nature: Travos exper-
iments with 10 nodes only, while FuzzyTrust trials with
10.000 peers at best. Reputation system experiments tend
to focus on prediction correctness instead of performance,
and no benchmarks have been established for either yet.
Social requirements depend on the application environ-
ment. The reputation-handling needs of a file sharing net-
work and those of an electronic marketplace are different
because of the varying level of inherent risk involved in a
transaction. In addition, the environment of the application
can be nearly closed or very open, and contain some infras-
tructure to support accountability or otherwise reduce risk,
e.g. by insurance. Large pseudonymous networks, where
the average actor is a newcomer with at most a handful of
transactions, are among the most challenging environments
for a reputation system. On the other hand, the application
may allow us to mostly ignore all but a few actors. The chal-
lenge to a reputation system designer is to recognize what
is really needed and which trade-offs are valid.
Scalability to real use requires addressing three load-
related challenges: the load placed on the trustor trying
to perform an analysis, the load placed on high-reputation
nodes as transaction partners or recommenders, and the load
placed on the network through recommendation transfers.
Allowing different levels of analysis based on the situation
is a partial solution to the trustor and network load. Making
sure that fresh actors are regularly sought as partners and
recommenders addresses the load on high-reputation nodes
to a degree. Storing recommendations systematically, lim-
iting information sources used or not distributing reputation
calculations to all trustors can also address the network load
problem, but demand new layers of trust.
In order to make reputation systems more mature for rou-
tine trust decisions in open network environments, a number
of challenges have to be addressed. We have envisioned a
global system where trust decisions are made locally, but
reputation information is shared in a global reputation man-
agement network.
First, for this vision, the reputation information should
be standardized to achieve interoperability between systems
and services that use them. The granularity of targets to
which reputation information is associated should be first
determined and then, suitable identification mechanism for
these targets provided. The granules of interest depend on
the application area, but can involve for example humans,
machines, and business services.
Second, experience-based reputation information should
be based on a commonly acceptable framework of con-
cepts, ranging for example from successful and correct per-
formance in business transactions to illegal transactions or
breaches of technical criteria. For all these axes, ontologies
should be developed to capture the metrics to be used.
Third, the role we envision for reputation systems in the
open collaborations creates new vulnerabilities. We have
started a comprehensive threat analysis of systems support-
ing trust, reputation and privacy management, but additional
work is still needed for creating a system that would resist
these new threats. One of the essential aspects of this de-
velopment is the extensive use of credibility metainforma-
tion on exchanged reputation information and development
of trust decision algorithms sensitive to both the credibility
measures and changes in them.
Finally, we have noted the absence of benchmarks suit-
able for comparing the effectiveness (performance) of mak-
ing trust decisions, or causing changes in trust decisions de-
pending on the reputation information.
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